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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Kay James Kofoed appeals from his judgment of conviction for possession of a 
controlled substance. He asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to 
suppress. Specifically, he asserts that suppression was proper on the grounds that the 
officers' entry into his residence was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment of the 
United States Constitution, Article I, Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, and I.C. § 19-
4409, in that it failed to substantially comply with the requirements of the "knock and 
announce" rule. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Kofoed resided at 2007 ½ N. Whitley Drive in a loft space above a workshop 
in a metal building. (R., p.100.) In October, 2006, during the arrest of an employee of 
Mr. Kofoed, officers walked through the building in order to allow another individual to 
obtain identification. (R., pp.100-101.) The officers did not conduct a search of the 
building at that time. (R., p.101.) 
On October 24, 2006, Officer Huff responded to a complaint of a strong chemical 
odor at a grocery store a short distance away from the Mr. Kofoed's residence. 
(R., p.101.) He eventually tracked the smell to an area of storage units near 
Mr. Kofoed's workshop. (R., p.101.) On October 30, 2006, the officer responded to 
another complaint regarding a chemical odor coming from the same area. (R., p.101.) 
Officer Huff summoned Officer Hall of the Payette Police Department; both officers 
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identified the odor as consistent with that which is present during the manufacture of 
methamphetamine. (R., p.101.) 
A search warrant was applied for and issued on November 2, 2006, and was 
executed the following day at approximately 11 a.m. (R., p.101.) After knocking on the 
door and announcing their presence, officers heard a sound like something was 
dropped and heard footsteps moving quickly away from the door. (R., p.101.) As a 
result, the officers "immediately" entered the building and served the warrant. 
(R., p.101.) The district court found that "the officers knocked on the door, 
approximately two seconds later announced their position and authority, and 
approximately four seconds thereafter were entering the workshop." (R., p.105.) The 
occupants, therefore, were given four seconds to open the door following the 
announcement that the knock came from a police officer. Mr. Kofoed filed a motion to 
suppress, asserting, among other arguments, that the officers failed to comply with the 
"knock and announce" rule. (R., p.60.) 
The district court found that an exigency was present: 
the warrant was executed close to noon, when people would normally be 
up and about. However, the officers could not be sure of the amount of 
drugs or other evidence that would be present. Thus, when they heard 
sounds that indicated people were quickly moving away from the door, it 
was reasonable for them to believe that evidence was being, or was about 
to be, destroyed, thereby created exigent circumstances that justified the 
officers' hurried entry into the building. 
(R., p.106.) The district court, therefore, denied the motion to suppress. (R., p.100.) 
Mr. Kofoed entered in to a conditional plea wherein he pleaded guilty to 
possession of a controlled substance and he preserved the right to appeal from the 
denial of his motion to suppress. (R., p.117.) The district court imposed a unified 
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sentence of four years, with one and one-half years fixed, and the court retained 
jurisdiction. (R., p.136.) Mr. Kofoed timely appealed. (R., p.141.) On appeal, he 
asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress because the 





Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Kofoed's motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Kofoed's Motion To Suppress 
A. Introduction 
The district court concluded that the police were excused from adhering to the 
"knock and announce" rule's requirement because of an exigency. Mr. Kofoed asserts 
that the district court erred. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of review of a suppression motion is bifurcated. When a decision 
on a motion to suppress is challenged, this Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact 
which were supported by substantial evidence, but freely reviews the application of 
constitutional principles to the facts as found. State v. Atkinson, 128 Idaho 559, 561, 
916 P.2d 1284, 1286 (Ct. App. 1996). 
C. The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Kofoed's Motion To Suppress 
Mr. Kofoed asserts that the district court erred by denying his motion to suppress 
because the officers did not substantially comply with the "knock and announce" rule. 
1. The Officers Did Not Substantially Comply With The "Knock And 
Announce" Rule 
Both the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I, 
Section 17 of the Idaho Constitution, guarantee "[t]he right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures." (emphasis added.) "The United States Supreme Court has held that the 






search warrant the police must knock on the door, announce their identity and authority, 
and wait a reasonable time for the occupants to respond before entering forcibly." 
Statev. Ramos, 142 Idaho 628,630,130 P.3d 1166, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing 
United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003); Richards v. Wisconsin, 520 U.S. 385, 
387 (1997); Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927, 934 (1995)). 
Idaho Code § 19-4409 provides that in executing a warrant, "[t]he officer may 
break open any outer or inner door or window of a house, or any part of a house, or any 
thing therein, to execute the warrant, if, after notice of his authority and purpose, he is 
refused admittance." J.C. § 19-4409. "However, this rule is not absolute and the Court 
recognized that, under some circumstances, an unannounced entry was permissible." 
Ramos, 142 Idaho at 631, 130 P.3d at 1169 (citing Richards, 520 U.S. at 387). 
"Specific exigencies include threats to officer safety or a likelihood that evidence 
might be destroyed." Id. (citing Richards, 520 U.S. at 391, 117 S. Ct. at 1420, 137 
L.Ed.2d at 622.) "In order to justify such an entry, the police must have reasonable 
suspicion that knocking and announcing prior to entry would pose a threat to their safety 
or inhibit the investigation." Id. (citing Banks, 540 U.S. at 36; Richards, 520 U.S. at 
394.) 'The reasonable suspicion standard requires less than probable cause but more 
than mere speculation or instinct on the part of the officer." Id. (citing State v. Cerino, 
141 Idaho 736, 738, 117 P.3d 876, 878 (Ct. App. 2005)). "In justifying the particular 
intrusion, the police officer must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, 
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that 
intrusion." Id. (citing Terryv. Ohio, 392 U.S.1, 21 (1968); Cerino, 141 ldahoat738, 117 
P.3d at 878.) 
6 
Even if exigent circumstances are initially absent, however, reasonable suspicion 
of an exigency may develop when the police arrive to execute a search warrant, and the 
police may then proceed with immediate forced entry. See Banks, 540 U.S. at 37. The 
police may also conduct a forced entry after knocking and announcing if exigent 
circumstances arise prior to an occupant answering the door. See id. at 38. Post-knock 
exigencies are to be treated the same as exigencies giving rise to a no-knock entry. Id. 
at 41. The type of evidence that provides reasonable suspicion of exigent 
circumstances, allowing forced entry after the police arrive or after they knock and 
announce, is to be determined on a case-by-case basis by considering the totality of the 
circumstances. Id. at 36. 
In this case, the district court found that "the officers knocked on the door, 
approximately two seconds later announced their position and authority, and 
approximately four seconds thereafter were entering the workshop." (R., p.105.) The 
occupants, therefore, were given four seconds to open the door following the 
announcement that the knock came from a police officer. The district court found that 
an exigency was present: 
the warrant was executed close to noon, when people would normally be 
up and about. However, the officers could not be sure of the amount of 
drugs or other evidence that would be present. Thus, when they heard 
sounds that indicated people were quickly moving away from the door, it 
was reasonable for them to believe that evidence was being, or was about 
to be, destroyed, thereby created exigent circumstances that justified the 
officers' hurried entry into the building. 
(R., p.106.) The district court erred. 
Regarding the fact that the officers could not be sure of the amount of drugs or 




is no blanket exception to the knock-and-announce requirement for drug investigations." 
Ramos, 142 Idaho at 631, 130 P.3d at 1169 (citing Richards, 520 U.S. at 393.) In 
Richards, the United States Supreme Court determined that, "while felony drug 
investigations may pose special risks to officer safety and the preservation of evidence, 
it is an overgeneralization to find every drug investigation poses these risks." Id. (citing 
Richards, 520 U.S. at 392-94.) Additionally, if a drug crime category exception to the 
knock-and-announce rule is recognized, that same logic could be applied to a multitude 
of other crimes and would eventually make the knock-and-announce rule essentially 
meaningless. Id. (citing Richards, 520 U.S. at 394.). Given this, the Court held that 
justification for a no-knock entry must be determined on a case-by-case analysis, and 
there cannot be an exception to this analysis by making particular categories of alleged 
crimes an automatic exigent circumstance. Id. (citing Richards, 520 U.S. at 392-394.) 
The fact that the officers did not know the quantity of drugs that might be in the 
residence does not justify the failure to substantially comply with the "knock and 
announce" rule. Absent an informant who is in the residence at the time the police 
arrive, police officers are never going to know the precise amount of drugs they may 
find. To hold that officers may suddenly enter because they are unsure of the quantity 
of drugs is the equivalent of a blanket exception to the "knock and announce" rule in 
drug cases. 
Furthermore, the fact that the officers heard movement away from the door does 
not establish an exigency in this case. In the affidavit in support of the search warrant, 
Officer Huff stated that his observations were "indicative of an illegal drug operation" 
and that Officer Hall "identified the odor as an odor that is consistent with, and often 
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present during, the manufacture of methamphetamine." (R., p.74.) Therefore, the 
officers had suspicion not that simple drug possession was occurring at the residence, 
but that drug manufacture was occurring. While it may be possible for an occupant to 
dispose of a small quantity of drugs prior to an officer entering a residence, it is 
extremely unlikely that evidence of manufacturing, such as a methamphetamine 
laboratory and all of the precursors to methamphetamine, would be quickly destroyed. 
And while the officer stated, "it is my opinion that upon service of this search warrant an 
operational laboratory will not be discovered; however, remnants of the lab such as 
glass beakers, finished product, quantities of precursors, and other forms of 
paraphernalia will be found," (R., p.75), there was no way for him to know before 
entering whether he would find an operational laboratory or just remnants of a lab. 
In any event, due to the fact that the officers possessed information that 
manufacturing was occurring in the residence, it is highly unlikely that movement away 
from the door would create the exigency that the evidence would be destroyed. The 
fact that the officers were unsure of the quantities of drugs they might and that they 
heard movement did not create an exigency in this case. The district court therefore 
erred in holding that, due to an exigency, the officers were excused from substantially 
complying with the "knock and announce" rule. 
2. Suppression Is The Remedy Under The Idaho Constitution 
In Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006) the United States Supreme Court 
held that the Fourth Amendment does not require suppression of evidence obtained 
following a violation of the "knock and announce" rule. Id. at 599. However, 
suppression remains the remedy in Idaho. Ramos, 142 Idaho at 634, 130 P.3d at 1172. 
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In Ramos, the Court of Appeals concluded, after finding that the officers did not 
substantially comply with the "knock and announce" rule, "even if exclusion of the 
evidence is not the necessary remedy for the Fourth Amendment violation, it would be 
required here for violation of Idaho's Constitution and statutory law." Id. The court 
noted, "long before the exclusionary rule was found to apply to the states through the 
Due Process Clause, it was the law in Idaho. Id. (citing State v. Conner, 59 Idaho 695, 
703, 89 P.2d 197, 201 (1939)). Indeed, the Idaho Supreme Court has held that the "rule 
is well settled in this state that evidence, procured in violation of defendant's 
constitutional immunity from search and seizure, is inadmissible and will be excluded if 
request for its suppression be timely made." Connor, 59 Idaho at 703, 89 P.2d at 201. 
Furthermore, in analyzing Idaho's knock-and-announce statutes, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has held that, once it is determined a defendant's rights have been violated by 
police entry into a residence, evidence resulting from the entry must be suppressed. 
State v. Rauch, 99 Idaho 586, 594, 586 P.2d 671, 679 (1978). In explaining its 
decision, the Idaho Supreme Court held that any other 'result would completely nullify 
the knock-and-announce statutes and would create a dangerous situation for citizens 
and police officers alike. Id. 
Therefore, under Rauch and Ramos, suppression remains the remedy in Idaho 
despite the holding Hudson. It is the required remedy in this case for the failure to 
substantially comply with the "knock and announce" requirement. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Kofoed respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order of 
judgment and commitment and reverse the order which denied his motion to suppress. 
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